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Abstract
This Essay will argue that any transitional mechanism must be by its nature and temporal
historical location a politically contested instrument. This can have differing political and so-
cial impacts, and impact on the human rights culture in the society in question. Based on the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (”TRC”) experience, two rights-based issues
– namely, human rights and victims’ rights – will be discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The understanding of truth commissions - as one mecha-
nism of transitional justice - has changed in the last few years.1
In the past, truth commissions were largely understood as inves-
tigative mechanisms with the primary aim of publishing an au-
thoritative and factual report on human rights violations com-
mitted in a country. The societal impact of gathering informa-
tion was given little attention. Currently, however, "the
possibility of holding public hearings, advancing societal and in-
dividual healing, and taking part in or promoting a process of
reconciliation (however defined) has opened wide the question
of means, independent of the final end reached. 2
The societal utility of truth commissions, and concepts such
as healing and reconciliation, has become a core part of the criti-
cal discussion about the impact of such bodies. Whether transi-
tional justice mechanisms - in this case, truth commissions -
should be concerned with concepts such as healing is a point for
debate. That said, the potential for truth recovery mechanisms
to contribute to healing and reconciliation has been ubiqui-
tously asserted. This is the case in societies as diverse as South
Africa,' Northern Ireland,4 Sierra Leone5 and East Timor.6
* Research Associate, Democratic Dialogue, Belfast, and the Centre for the Study
of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa.
1. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
AlROCnvr (2001).
2. Id. at 252.
3. KADER ASMAL, LOUISE ASMAL & RONALD S. ROBERTS, RECONCILIATION THROUGH
TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APAITHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (1994); DEALING WITH T-IIE
PAsT: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (Alex Boraine, A:J. Levy & R. Schef-
fer eds., 1994).
4. HEALING THROUGH REMEMBERING, REPORT OF THE HEALING THROUGH REMEMBER-
IN( PROJECT (2002).
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This is particularly interesting, considering the degree to
which truth commissions have proliferated. There have been
over twenty truth commissions in the last two decades.7 To lo-
cate the precise reason for the political popularity of such mech-
anisms is difficult. Does the trend for truth commissions as a
primary transitional justice mechanism rest on their proven abil-
ity to play a role in uncovering the truth, promoting healing and
fostering reconciliation?8 Or, from a more cynical perspective, is
the notion of "reconciliation" a complex modern foil used to
market unfavorable compromises made during political negotia-
tions?
This Essay will argue that any transitional mechanism must
be by its nature and temporal historical location a politically con-
tested instrument. This can have differing political and social
impacts, and impact on the human rights culture in the society
in question. Based on the South African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission ("TRC") experience, two rights-based issues -
namely, human rights and victims' rights - will be discussed.
The implications of the points raised in that regard will be ap-
plied to the current debate in Northern Ireland about dealing
with the past.
I. THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The core justification (or perhaps rationalization) for the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is captured
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu when he says that without the ne-
gotiations "we would have been overwhelmed by the bloodbath
that virtually everyone predicted as the inevitable ending for
5. See Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, Sec. 6(1) (2000)
(stating that one of its objectives is "to promote healing and reconciliation").
6. See United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor, Regulation 2000/10
on the Establishment of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, Sec. (d)
(stating that the Commission is grounded in "the desire to promote national reconcilia-
tion and healing").
7. HAYNER, supra n.l, at 291.
8. See Brandon Hamber, Ere Their Stoy Die: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in South
AJrica, 44(1) RACE AND CLAss 61, 79 (2002) (discussing the different ways reconciliation
was defined in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") pro-
cessl.
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South Africa."' From this perspective, the agreement at the ne-
gotiations to grant amnesty to perpetrators of apartheid violence
was a pragmatic choice enshrined in the interim Constitution.
Amnesty, especially for apartheid forces - or so the argument
goes - was the cost (especially to victims seeking justice through
the courts) of saving the innumerable lives that would have been
lost had the conflict continued. Using this argument, amnesty
was about the advancement of "reconciliation and reconstruc-
tion."")
Amnesty in South Africa, however - unlike many other
countries, particularly those in Latin America - was neither
blanket nor automatic. Conditions applied to the amnesty. The
TRC was the vehicle for amnesty, assessing applications and adju-
dicating on them based on criteria set down in the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act."' Linking amnesty into
the process was a unique development, and highly unusual for a
truth commission.
To receive amnesty, perpetrators of political violence -
from every side - had to disclose full details of each and every
past crime for which they wanted amnesty. Amnesty had to be-
sought for each crime individually, and if successful only that
crime was amnestied. Simply put, provided the perpetrators told
the truth and confessed their involvement in a specific act that
was found to be political in nature based on the criteria in the
Act, justice would be overlooked. If granted amnesty, criminal
and civil liability fell away for that crime.
Broadly speaking, although amnesty did not deliver justice
through the courts, it was hoped it would at least produce truth.
Truth was considered vital to understanding what had hap-
pened, assisting victims to come to terms with the past, and
preventing its repetition. Truth was considered a basic building
block of reconciliation.
Victims of political violence were also given the opportunity
9. 1 REPORT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ch. 1,
22 (1998).
10. See The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, No. 24
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Act]; S.A. INTERIM CONST.
I I. See 1995 Act, supra n.10 (discussing a full mandate of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission). See also HAYNER, supra n.1, at 32; ALEX BORAINE, A
COUNTRY UNMASKED: SOUTH AFRIcA'S TRU-1-1 AND RECONCILIAlIION COMMISSION (2002)
(both providing a detailed summary of the South Africa's TRC's mandate).
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to divulge how they had suffered in the past, either publicly or
through a statement to the TRC. Each case was to be docu-
mented, and if necessary investigated. The TRC then made pro-
posals on how to prevent future human-rights violations, as well
as recommendations regarding possible reparations for victims.
The South African TRC process began in December 1995
and ended - at least in terms of documenting and receiving
victim statements - when the commission handed its 3,500-
page report to then President Mandela in October 1998. The
amnesty hearings dragged into 2002 and the final volumes of the
report focusing on amnesty were published in March 2003. In
total, about 20,000 people came forward and gave statements to
the TRC, of which about 2,000 were heard in public. 7,700 peo-
ple applied for amnesty, and roughly 1,200 of these individuals
received amnesty for their crimes, which included murder, at-
tempted murder, abduction or "disappearance," and torture.
A. The South African Case: A Brief Evaluation
Public acknowledgement, breaking the silence of the past,
creating an unforgettable record of the atrocities committed,
and voicing of past crimes were the TRC's greatest successes.
12
Many of the horrors of apartheid were made public. Figures
such as Tutu - and the TRC as a whole - humanized and indi-
vidualized the impact of decades of apartheid. A new vision
based on a reconciled future, arguably essential for that period
of time, was created. Humanism and the possibilities of peace
and even forgiveness, despite the legacy of brutality, became
real, if not attainable in some cases.
For a minority of victims, suppressed truths about the past
were also uncovered. Missing bodies, at least in some cases, were
12. Through research with some twenty-five organizations across South Africa, it
was felt that the process of unleashing the stories, revealing hidden traumas and uncov-
ering latent tensions was the TRC's most positive contribution. See Hugo van der
Merwe, Polly Dewhirst & Brandon Hamber, Non-governmental Organisations and the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission: An Impact Assessment, 26(1) POLrnKON 55, 79 (1999);
Brandon Hamber, Does the Truth Heal: A Psychological Perspective on the Political Strategies
for Dealing with the Legacy of Political Violence, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND
DOINGJUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLI:T (Nigel Biggar ed., 2001) [hereinafter Does the Truth
Heal]; Maly Burton, The South Aiican Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Looking Back,
Moving Forvard - Revisiting Conflicts, Striving for Peace, in PAST IMPERFECT: DEALING WITH
THE PAST IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION (Brandon Hamber ed.,
1998).
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located, exhumed and respectfully buried. For others, the con-
fessions of perpetrators brought answers to previously unsolved
political crimes - crimes which the courts, due to expense and
inefficiency, might never have tried or dealt with. In many
senses, the chain of command, especially in terms of State terror,
was laid bare and it was made clear who held ultimate responsi-
bility.' 3
That said, although the TRC has on the whole been seen as
successful in revealing the broad and essential story of what hap-
pened in South Africa between 1960 and 1994, not all the truth
about the past has emerged.' 4 This factor undermined the pro-
cess of reconciliation as it was originally envisaged. The TRC
began a process it was unable to complete. There is a huge
amount of evidence yet to be uncovered, and many of the guilty
remain in positions of considerable power.' 5
Many relatives of the missing and the murdered, including
high profile cases such as Biko, Ribeiro, Mxenge, Slovo, Schoon,
Asvat, and Madaka, are still seeking justice and fundamental ele-
ments of the truth.' Scores of victims feel let down in that they
did not get the whole truth through the TRC process.' v Al-
though it would never have been feasible to investigate every
case, many victims' high expectations were dashed and the com-
mission's credibility consequently undermined in their eyes. On
the psychological front, the process may have helped some with
healing, but was hardly sufficient and the impact not necessarily
beneficial. '
Justice, in the retributive sense, remains a burning issue and
the entire justification for amnesty was often unacceptable to
13. TERRY BELL. & DUMISA B. NTSEBEZA, UNFINISIElD BUSINESS: SouiH AFRI(Ax
APARTHEID AND TRUTII 209 (2001).
14. Jonathan Klaaren & Howard Varney, A Second Bite at the Amnesty Chrty? Consti-
tutional and Policy Around Legislationfbr a Second Amnesty, 117 S. AFR. L.J. 572, 593 (2000).
15. BELL & NIISBEZA, supra n.13, at 286.
16. Id.
17. See Brandon Hamber, Dineo Nageng & Gabriel O'Malley, Telling It Like It Is
.Understanding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission from the Perspective oJ Survivors,
26 PsYcH-oLoC IN SoC.IETYv (2000) [hereinafter Telling It Like It Is]; Piers Pigou, False
Promises and Wasted Opportunities? Inside South Aficau Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in COMMISSIONING THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING Sou'[-i AFRI(A's TRUTH AND RECON(ILIA-
TION COMMISSION (Deborah Posel & Graeme Simpson eds., 2002).
18. Brandon Hamber, The Burdens ol'Tri/h: An Evaluation of the Psychological Support
Services and Initiatives Undertaken by the South Afican Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
55(1) AMERICAN IMAO 9, 28 (1998); Does the Truth Heal, sunpra n.12.
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many victims."' Politicians may have been able to justify the ex-
change of formal justice for peace, but it has been difficult for
victims to watch while the perpetrators have received amnesty.
Justice is an important and sometimes essential component of a
victim's recovery and psychological healing; 20 so, too, are repara-
tions. At the time of writing, the African National Congress
("ANC") government of Thabo Mbeki had just acted on the
TRC's recommendations regarding long-term reparations sub-
mitted to the government in October 1998.1 On April 15, 2003,
South African President, Thabo Mbeki, announced that victims
of apartheid who testified before the TRC would receive a once-
off final reparations grant of R30,000 (US $3,842). A total of US
$85 million would be paid to 19,000 victims - considerably less
than the US $360 million recommended by the TRC. Ntombi
Mosikare, co-ordinator of the Khulumani Support Group, said
that Mr. Mbeki's words still stung like salt in a wound: " we only
want the country to acknowledge us. What they are giving us is
too little."2
B. Confusing Compromise and Human Rights
Transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions
are by definition established during times of political instability
or, colloquially stated, when new rules for the political game are
being forged. This is inevitably characterized by a push toward
political and social stability, particularly if a regime change is
happening by negotiation and coupled with a cessation of hostil-
ities that have dragged on for many years. This can, and gener-
ally does, involve compromise by all parties concerned.
19. See Telling It Like It Is, supra n.17, at 18-42. See also James L. Gibson & Amanda
Gouws, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Attributions of Blame and the Struggle over
Apartheid, 93(3) AM. POLITCAL Sci. RiVv. 501 (1998) (finding in public opinion surveys
that there was significant opposition to amnesty in SotIth Africa).
20. DANIEL WAT. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER McCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECU-
TION OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, PSYCH:OLOGICAL ANt) MORAL CONCERNS (2000);
Debra Kaminer et al., The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Relation to
Psychiatric Status and Forgiveness Among Survivors of Human Rights Abuse, 178 BRIT. J. OF
PSYCHIATRV 373, 377 (2001).
21. The reparations debate, and the proposals of the TRC Report are beyond the
scope of the present paper. See Brandon Hamber, Repairing the Irreparable: Dealing with
the Double-Binds of Making Reparations for Crimes of the Past, 5 ETHNICITY AND HEALTH 215,
226 (2000).
22. South Africa to Pay $3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid Victims, N.Y. TIMES, INT'L,
Apr. 16, 2003, at A5.
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In this context, it is legitimate to ask whether truth commis-
sions are a fundamental part of peacemaking or peace-building,
or perhaps something else altogether. Some argue that, under
certain circumstances, they are the best way of ensuring account-
ability for past crime.23 Such accountability would be achieved
by investigating the past, acting on what is uncovered, and,
through this, facilitating a break with the past. Others see them
as potentially part of the machinery that ultimately legitimizes a
new political order. 4 The ANC's aspirations at the beginning of
the South African TRC was to undertake the process "as quickly
as possible so that we can indeed let bygones be bygones and
allow the [N]ation to forgive a past it nevertheless dare not for-
get." 5 This sentiment of addressing the past as quickly as possi-
ble while maintaining some historical memory is not uncommon
among successor regimes and political parties moving through a
political negotiation process.
From a critical perspective, reconciliation - with the TRC
as its champion - has become a euphemism for the so-called
compromises made during the political negotiations, i.e., the
maintenance of white control over the economy with some black
elite economic advancement at the expense of radical structural
change. From this perspective, racialized structural violence as
the bedrock of apartheid oppression was sidelined in favor of an
individualized violation-driven analysis.2" Those who suffered
from the socio-economic depredations of the system as a whole
were not defined "victims" as such. Further, a more cynical view
is that the rapprochement between the old and new govern-
ments was primarily about consolidating a new black elite under
the banner of reconciliation. In reality, however, the "truth"
probably lies somewhere between (and about) the polemics. It
is deeply embedded in an intricate web of relationships and in-
23. ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASK.D: Souiii AFRicA's TRUTH1 AND RECONCILIA -
TION COMMISSION (2000); DE SMOND TurU, No FUTriURE wi'TiouT FORGIVENESS (1999).
24. RiCHARD VILSON, THE POLITCS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SouiHi AF-
RICeA: LEGITIMiZINC TilE IEOST-APARTIHI) STATE (2001).
25. African National Congress ("ANC") Department of Information and Publicity,
African National Congress: Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 20
(1997).
26. James M. Statman, Exorcising the Ghosts ofApartheid: Memoy, Identity and Trauma
in the "New" South Africa (paper presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of International
Society of Political Psychology july 8, 1995); Mahmood Mamdani, Reconciliation Without
Jiotice, 46 S.A. REv. OF Boos 3, 5 (1996).
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ter-dependencies more nuanced than the reductionist views ex-
pressed above.27
Although the TRC can be theoretically criticized for not tak-
ing on the entire system in its mandate (a process which was
practically impossible anyway), it is interesting to note that
within a rapidly liberalizing South Africa, dominated by a new
authority seeking hegemony, the TRC did attempt - at least in
its report - to push the boundaries of what was acceptable. Ex-
amples include: arguing for an extended wealth tax to redress
the imbalances created by apartheid; labeling beneficiaries of
the system as responsible through acts of omission; and finding
members of the ANC (the current party of government) respon-
sible for some human rights violations.
A careful analysis of the TRC process reveals that from its
inception it was plagued by competing visions of what the en-
deavor was all about. These two visions raise the question of
whether the TRC was a quasi-legal process of truth recovery and
rigorous investigation, or fundamentally a mechanism about the
attainment of reconciliation and healing through emotional and
moral catharsis. 28 From this perspective, the TRC cannot be dis-
missed as a simple linear expression of the negotiations, but
should, in itself, be considered a contested space.
Intrinsic to the TRC and the Act that defined its operations
was sufficient power to make serious incisions into past impunity
if the will was there. Individuals could be subpoenaed and held
to account publicly through hearings. A good working relation-
ship with the Attorney General's Office could have ensured
more detailed questioning of amnesty applicants appearing
before the TRC.2 9 By emphasizing the imperative of finding the
truth and doing as much justice as possible in every case (even if
beyond the TRC's life), the TRC could have laid a more solid
27. See Brandon Hamber, Irreconcilable Tensions: Transformation and Reconciliation in
Post-apartheid South Africa, in CONTEMPORARY PEACE MAKING (Roger MacGinty & John
Darby eds., forthcoming, 2003); Brandon Hamber, Ere Their Story Die: Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation in South Afica, 44(1) RACE AND CLASS 61, 79 (2002) (both providing a
more detailed discussion on these differing perspectives).
28. WILSON, supra n.24.
29. See Piers Pigou, False Promises and Wasted Opportunities? Inside Sough Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in COMMISSIONING THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING
SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 54-56 (Deborah Posel &
Graeme Simpson eds., 2002) (providing a more detailed discussion on the relationship
between the Attorney General's Office and the TRC).
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foundation for prosecution of those who did not apply for am-
nesty after the Commission. The degree to which the TRC did
this, however, was ultimately as much about the contested inter-
nal and external visions of its purpose, as about opposing and
competing ideologies of reconciliation.
For example, the Commission possessed extensive search,
seizure, and subpoena powers, more so than other truth com-
missions."' Although there were no limits to the number of
times a person could be subpoenaed, no efforts were made to
solicit information in this regard until the end of the first year of
the TRC's two-year life span."' This was most evident in the
TRC's admission of an "incorrect decision" when they failed to
subpoena Chief Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party
("IFP"). The IFP was the party responsible for the highest per-
centage of non-State violations that came before the Commis-
sion. The TRC admits that it ultimately succumbed "to the fears
of those who argued that Buthelezi's appearance would give him
a platform from which to oppose the Commission and would
stoke the flames of violence in KwaZulu-Natal." 2
This is symptomatic of a larger issue that was present
throughout the life of the TRC, namely the tension between
those who favored the voluntary participation of people before
the commission and those who preferred the use of subpoena
powers to demand testimony from alleged perpetrators. Views
on this were often determined by individuals' conceptualizations
of reconciliation and the role of the legal process. Terry Bell
captures this when he writes that certain obvious investigations
were not followed up because of
... time constraints and a fundamentally religious attitude
towards reconciliation. It was summed up in the phrase 'we
will have no witch hunts.' What this meant was the accept-
ance that the process concerned individual perpetrators and
victims, with the perpetrators being given the opportunity of
confession to clear their consciences.:
For some, therefore, national unity was the priority and this
30. 1 SouTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, FINAL RFPORTr OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ch. 4, at 26 (1998).
31. Pigou, supra n.29, at 52.
32. 5 SouH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, FINAl. REPORT OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTrH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ch. 6, at 26 (1998).
33. BEIL & NTSFEBYA, supra n.13, at 205.
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could only be achieved through a voluntary admission of guilt,
and hopefully remorse. This was in contrast to those influenced
by a more human rights (or perhaps legalistic) ideology of rec-
onciliation, which saw labeling those responsible and calling
them to account as paramount to ending impunity.
To this end, the South African TRC demonstrates how the
social and political context can define the way in which the law
(in this case the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act) will ultimately be implemented or interpreted. Although
this is not unique to the South African experience, or the Act in
question, this situation is important because it can have signifi-
cant consequences, particularly when dealing with a society in
transition, where new norms are attempting to be established,
impunity crushed, and a human rights culture ushered in.
Amnesty was ostensibly a political necessity for underpin-
ning a new social order founded on human rights principles, or
so the dominant South African political argument went. The
linking of amnesty into the South African TRC process, however,
has meant that human rights as a concept has become associated
with the language of pragmatic political compromise. The lan-
guage of principle and accountability were undermined, and
this association remains one of the obstacles to the popular ac-
ceptance of human rights as a new ideology in South Africa. 4
By placing amnesty with reconciliation, its bedfellow, at the
core of the South African TRC, the real benefits of the truth
commission have been sidelined in South Africa, and in much
subsequent international debate. Arguably, truth commissions
are best at telling the story of the past from the perspective of
victims, allowing victims to tell their stories in an uninhibited
fashion, explaining conflicts in broad causal terms, and as-
signing responsibility and accountability while leaving justice to
the courts.
C. Victims' Rights: What Agenda?
Although the South African TRC process was billed as a "vic-
tim-centered" Commission (and it was to a degree), victims'
rights, like human rights, were primarily dealt with through the
prism of political compromise. Even in traditional legal think-
34. WILSON, supra n.24, at 228.
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ing, the phrase "victims' rights" hardly features.35 Nonetheless,
it is as interesting to note the degree to which the criminal jus-
tice system as a whole has advanced the issue of victims' rights
compared to its scant mention in the field of transitional justice.
Most texts on transitional justice seem to begin with a dis-
cussion of how to deal with the past from the question of con-
straint (e.g., does the society have the resources to prosecute
past crime, or what would prosecutions mean for lasting stabil-
ity), rather than moving from a rights-based position. There is a
well-known legal debate about the right to truth and justice,
but victims' rights remain to be "centered" in the transitional
justice debate. In fact, victims' rights (particularly at the political
level) are often seen as a stumbling block in the way of achieving
pragmatic political change, rather than the other way around.
The South African case in which the Azanian Peoples Or-
ganization ("AZAPO") and the survivors' families of high-profile
murder cases (Biko, Mxenge, and Ribeiro) challenged Section
20(7) of the National Unity, and Reconciliation Act provides an
example in this regard. 7 The families argued that the TRC's
ability to grant amnesty denied the victims' right of access to
courts and as such, was inconsistent with the Constitution. Their
challenge, however, was unsuccessful. The court held that to en-
sure democracy in South Africa, amnesty was a pragmatic neces-
sity. It was part of the foundation for the new Constitution in
the first place. Furthermore, it found that domestic constitu-
tional law is of greater significance than international law,3" and
that large-scale prosecutions were not possible given the ineffi-
ciencies of the court system. The TRC, it is argued, could deliver
peace and stability, and offer the potential for some truth and
reparations to a greater number of survivors then could the
35. Brice Dickson, The Role of Victims' Rights (2002) (unpublished paper presented
to the Democratic Dialogue Round Table on Victim Issues).
36. See Paul Seils, Reconciliation in Guatemala: the role of intelligent justice, 44(1) RACE
AND CLAss 33, 59 (2002) (arguing in favor of "intelligent justice" that is based on vic-
tirns' moral and legal right to justice).
37. See Azanian Peoples Organization ("AZAPO") and others v. President of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 CCT 17/96 (CC).
38. SeeJonathan Klaaren, A Second Organisational Amnesty (1999) (unpublished pa-
per presented at the History Workshop/CSVR TRC Conference, "The TRC: Commis-
sioning the Past") (discussing the opinion of legal scholar John Dugard that the judg-
ment was brief and incomplete, though not necessarily incorrect).
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courts. To put it bluntly, some of the rights of victims were
thereby forfeited for the so-called "greater good."
The details of the judgment are beyond the scope of this
Essay,"9 yet it is interesting to consider political reactions to the
process. At the time, members of the African National Congress
Youth League, a rival political party to AZAPO who brought the
case, supported the families' call." Nationally, however, the
ANC came out with a very different view to its Youth League.
They essentially labeled the families "anti-reconciliation," "un-
consciously working against the national interest," and largely
colluding (albeit unconsciously) with the apartheid State. The
TRC (a body that liked to portray itself as victim-centered) also
reacted angrily. It deemed the families to be opposed to recon-
ciliation. Archbishop Tutu himself said that he was "annoyed
and very hurt for the many people I know who want to tell their
stories" and hoped the group bringing the case would "get their
come-uppance."41
These reactions are interesting as they highlight the degree
to which the TRC process was tied into the notion of reconcilia-
tion. Individuals participating in the process were subject to far
greater forces than simply exercising their rights to truth, justice,
or reparation. The demands of the transitional context took pri-
ority. In essence, attempts by victims to achieve what they saw as
justice through the courts were seen as a hindrance to peace.
They had to forego rights, such as the right to access courts,
which are generally afforded to victims of "ordinary" crimes. In
this sense, the debate should focus on how victims of political
violence can receive a parity of rights to other victims, rather
than whether they should be treated as a special case compared
to, say, victims of domestic violence or car crashes.
That said, the TRC also mirrored one of the core weak-
nesses present in many criminal justice systems, i.e., there was
not a clear understanding of the relationship between the TRC
39. The intricacies of this debate are beyond this present scope. SeeJohn Dugard,
Dealing with Crime of a Past Regime: Is Amnesty Still an Option?, 12 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L.
1002, 1015 (2000); Klaaren, supra n.38; Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The De-
velopingJurisprndence on Amnesty, 20(4) HuIt. R-rs. Q. 843, 885 (1998).
40. Victims of apartheid need justice before reconciliation, Sourvi AFRICAN PRESS ASS'N,
Apr. 10, 1996.
41. Truth Commission not losing credibility, says Tutu, Souni AFRICAN PRESS ASS'N,
Apr. 11, 1996.
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and victims. It was always unclear what the outcomes would be
for victims. They might get truth, potentially justice (if the per-
petrator did not apply for amnesty, of course), and potentially
reparation. Of course, it was also hoped that some healing
might come from engaging in the process. In a word, outcomes
for the amnesty applicants were much clearer - either they re-
ceived amnesty or they did not.
To state the point polemically, just as the relationship be-
tween the offender and the State dominates most developments
in the criminal justice system, in terms of prosecution, punish-
ment, and rehabilitation, so too did the legal relationship be-
tween amnesty-applicant and the State largely drive the South
African TRC process. Granted, some victims found truths they
would not have known without the TRC, and for some, the pro-
cess of testifying could have been personally psychologically ben-
eficial;4" however, their relationship to the TRC was not as
clearly defined in terms of outcome. In this sense, ambivalence
around the outcome for victims could have fed into feelings of
low levels of subjective procedural justice."
The relationship between the victim and the State in the
transitional justice debate remains underdeveloped morally,
ethically, legally, and more critically, in practice. A relationship
between any body such as a truth commission (dealing with tran-
sitional justice issues) and the victims participating in it needs to
be articulated and explored in greater detail than is currently
the case. Such discussions could find expression in the form of a
Charter of Victim Rights in truth commission processes. The
U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power provides a good starting point for the
discussion on victims' rights. This declaration, however, is sel-
dom referred to, especially in the transitional justice literature."
42. Does the Truth Heal?, supra I. 12.
43. "Subjective procedural justice" is a term used in psychological literature. See,
e.g., E. AwI.XN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCttOOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
CRTrICAxL ISSUES IN SOCt:IL.JusTrcE (1988). In the psychological literature, compared to
the legal literature, when reference is made to procedural justice being high or low, it is
meant that those involved feel the process was fair or unfair. This is different from
assessing, based on some normative understanding, whether the process was objectively
fair or not.
44. This declaration is not without its flaws. For example, victims are only defined
as those directly affected and not their relatives or associates. The definitions also do
not really take into account the potential long-term impacts of extreme violence.
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New charters are of course not sufficient; rather, it is the process
around their development, the positioning of victims' rights at
the core of the transitional justice debate, and enforcing rights
through law, that are critical. This is particularly important if
transitional justice mechanisms continue to be so heavily tied to
the transitional context that individual participation in them is
understood to have a larger social meaning (e.g., reconcilia-
tion), rather than simple individual participation.
Currently, and certainly in the South African case, victims'
rights are often a yardstick of post-hoc rationalization once cer-
tain rights had been negotiated away. When truth commissions
are said to be victim-centered, this often means that victims are
psychologically and socially supported, given adequate space to
voice their opinions, and have their experiences validated and
acknowledged. Being truly victim-centered, however, requires a
paradigm shift in which victims' rights start to influence the tran-
sitional justice agenda to a far greater degree. In many societies,
victims' rights are understood as an obstacle to compromised
pragmatic political change, rather than the questions raised by
pragmatic political change being seen as a real threat to en-
trenching the rights of victims.
II. TRUTH RECOVERY" SOME THOUGHTS ON
NORTHERN IRELAND
In 1998, I undertook some research on whether or not
Northern Ireland should have a truth commission. I came to the
conclusion that, at that time, an official truth recovery process
seemed unlikely.4" Others made similar arguments, namely, that
no moral or political authority existed to support an entity such
as a truth commission." I further argued that the balance of
power between forces during transition generally determined
government policy on issues,4 7 and in Northern Ireland, at that
stage, the forces were too evenly weighed and all sides were opt-
ing to leave their truths hidden for the time being. As such:
45. BRANDON HAMBER, PAST IMPERFECT: DEALING WITH THE PAST IN NORTIIERN IRE-
LAND AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITIONS [hereinafter PAST IMPERFECT] (1998).
46. NIACRO AND VICTIM SUPPORT NORTHERN IRELAND, ALL. TRUTH IS BIVFER: A RE-
PORT OF THE VISIT OF DOCTOR ALEX BORAINE (1999).
47. Jamal Benomar, Confronting the Past:Justice in Transitions, 4(1)J. OF DEMOCRACY
13 (1993).
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Most political players demand truth from those they perceive
as the other side or sides, but seem unwilling to offer the
truth from their side, or acknowledge and take responsibility
for their actions. This is mostly due to fear that such acknowl-
edgement (public or otherwise) will weaken in the new dis-
pensation and that the truth may be used against them within
the context of the delicate peace that prevails. There are also
those in Northern Ireland who refuse to accept that they did
anything wrong or that their action (or inaction) was com-
plicit in perpetuating the conflict.4 8
Several years on, the endpoint has not shifted significantly,
but the debate and the intricacies of dealing with the past have
certainly gained political and public momentum. In addition,
various mechanisms that one could call truth-recovery processes
are underway. For example, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was an-
nounced on January 29, 1998, a commission to investigate disap-
pearances was also set up, and a number of ongoing legal mat-
ters have come before the European Court of Human Rights.4' 9
There are also many ongoing community initiative working with
memorials, oral history and commemoration. Ongoing projects
have also documented the extent of the conflict in Northern Ire-
land in great detail. 5 °1
The Healing Through Remembering consultation process
heralded probably the most thorough public and civil society in-
vestigation to date of strategies for dealing with the past.5' The
Project recommended that there be a network of commemora-
tion projects, a Day of Reflection, a collective storytelling pro-
cess, a permanent memorial museum concerning the conflict in
and about Northern Ireland, and that
48. PAST ]MI'ERFECT, s'upra n.45, at 80,81.
49. See, e.g.,Jordan, Kelly, McKerr & Shanaghan v. UK, Application Nos. 24746/94,
30054/96; 28883/95; and 37715/97 (2001). See also Fionnuala Ni AolAin Tt/ith Telling
Accountability and the Right to Life in Northern Ireland Issue, 5 E.H.R.L.R. (2002).
50. See, e.g., ARDOY'NE COMMEMORATION PROJECI, ARDOYNE: TIlE UNTOI.D TRUTH
(2002); DAVID McKirI'RICK, SEAMUS KIF.:1,ERS, BRIAN FINEY & CHRIS TiiORTON, LosT
lwivs: TilE STORIES OFT I'HE MEN, WOMEN AND CILIDREN WiiO DIED AS A RE sir OF -TiIE
NORTHERN IRELANID TROUIBLES (1999); MARIE-THERESE FV, MIKE MORRISSFY & MARIE
SMrInl, MAPPIMN TROUBLES R.LATEI) DEATxnS IN NORTIIERN IRELAND 1969-1998 (1998);
FINAl. REPORI BELFAST: TilE Cosr OF -I. TROUBLES SIUDY (1999).
51. See HEAl INc; THROUGH IREMEMI .RING, supra n.4. See also http://www.healing
throoghrenmembering.com for more details. In sum, this project undertook an exten-
sive national consultation process and published its findings on how the events con-
cerning the conflict in and about Northern Ireland could be remembered. See id.
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all organizations and institutions that have been engaged in
the conflict, including the British and Irish States, the politi-
cal parties and Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, should
honestly and publicly acknowledge responsibility for past po-
litical violence due to their acts of omission and commission.
We see this as the first and necessary step having the potenti-
ality of a larger process of truth recovery. When acknowl-
edgement is forthcoming, we recommended that measured,
inclusive and in-depth consideration be given to the establish-
ment of an appropriate and unique truth recovery process. "
Clearly, the use of the phrase "truth recovery" was deliber-
ate. It was broader than the idea of recommending a truth com-
mission as such. In the broadest sense, truth recovery could im-
ply mechanisms such as truth commissions run domestically or
intentionally, commissions of enquiry, tribunals or special prose-
cutions, or perhaps historically-based truth recovery processes
driven by victim narratives. Furthermore, the Report is at pains
to point out that any such process should relate to, and not re-
place, other formal truth finding structures that exist, namely
those within the existing criminal justice system and other associ-
ated mechanisms such as inquests, police investigations, prosecu-
tions and inquiries. Much work remains to be done before an
acceptable mechanism (that was also legally viable given other
developments) could come into being.
By stressing multiple mechanisms, however (including those
in its other recommendations), the Report perhaps draws its
strongest distinction from the South African process. In South
Africa, including amnesty in the TRC's remit meant that success-
ful amnesty applicants effectively bypassed the criminal justice
system altogether. Perhaps, in this sense, the Healing Through
Remembering Report's stress on complementarity may over-
come some of the problems of the South African process -
namely, the confusing of human rights discourse and truth with
compromise and amnesty, thus undermining the potential of an
undiluted human rights discourse associated with accountability
and principles,53 as was elucidated earlier in the Essay. Or, as
anthropologist Richard Wilson argues, the most successful truth
commissions have been those that have abandoned the trap-
52. 1(]. at 50.
53. WILSON, supra n.24.
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pings of law and allowed courts to administer amnesty provisions
or perhaps prosecutions (author's addition), and concentrated
more on truth finding and documenting historical lessons. In
this sense, these suggestions and current developments in North-
ern Ireland start to paint a picture of a much more diffuse ap-
proach to truth-recovery.
In terms of the issue of victims' rights in Northern Ireland,
it may be useful to note that there is, as in many countries, an
ongoing battle over degrees of suffering. That is, many victims'
groups qualify their victimhood. It has become common for
some groups to refer to themselves as "real" or "innocent" vic-
tims. 55 Such qualifications indirectly imply, whether purpose-
fully or not, that there must be "guilty" victims. Many victims of
paramilitary violence feel that their suffering is seen as less im-
portant in light of the concessions to political (largely Republi-
can) prisoners. Victims of State violence also feel they have al-
ways been secondary victims because the hegemony of British
State remains, and only a handful of soldiers and police have
been held to account for their actions. The phrase "hierarchy of
victims" has become commonplace.
Brice Dickson of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Com-
mission provides some useful pointers in this regard.' He notes
that it needs to be realized that the nature of victimhood differs
according to the nature of the wrong that has been committed
against the victim. The wrong has two aspects to it: the act itself
(e.g., the killing, the assault, the threat) and the consequences
of the act (e.g., the death, the injury, the fear). If we are to
decide what rights victims should have, he argues, we should
have regard for both aspects. The former aspect calls for rights
such as recognition, acknowledgement and apology. The latter
aspect calls for rights such as compensation and access to ser-
vices. The former is more politically contentious, and usually ac-
knowledgement and recognition are dealt with by truth commis-
sions and other official processes. It is interesting to note that
Northern Ireland has at least to some degree, and at this stage,
tried to incorporate some rights-based views of victims' rights in
54. I.
55. MIKE MORRISFY & MARIE SM,,Ini, NORTHERN IRFLANI) AFrER TIlE GOOD FRIDAY
AGRPEMENT: VICTIMS, GRIEVANCE AND BLAME 12 (2002).
56. See Dickson, supra n.35.
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the draft Bill of Rights. The draft Bill reads, under the heading
of "Victims of the Conflict":
With a view to promoting the principles of truth and reconcil-
iation in the aftermath of a lengthy period of conflict, the
Government shall take legislative and other measures to en-
sure that the loss and suffering of all victims of that conflict
and the responsibility of State and non-State participants are
appropriately and independently established and/or ac-
knowledged.5 7
Rights in relation to service delivery are more straightfor-
ward. It would appear that law could underpin rights to com-
pensation and adequate services - the draft Bill of Rights sup-
ports this. The difficulty, however, when dealing with the needs
of victims in transitional societies is that the complexity of truth,
justice and acknowledgement is often avoided. These issues are
inevitably political and the core of understandings of the con-
flict. This was evident in the recent Victims Strategy Document
developed by the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister,
which exclusively focused on services delivery to so-called "vic-
tims," choosing not at this stage to comment on truth and jus-
tice, pending the launch of the Healing Through Remembering
Project's Report - the Report of an independent voluntary or-
ganization not related to government.
The dominant focus on the psychological distress of victims
of violence at the expense of other needs is interesting to con-
sider in this regard. It could be argued that in many countries
an exclusive emphasis on the psychological needs of victims, al-
though necessary, is often used in the expectation that it will
meet other needs, such as victims' needs for truth, acknowledge-
ment and justice. The practical and political challenge of mak-
ing policy on matters concerning those who have suffered,
means that the needs of victims are often relegated (or compart-
mentalized off) to the therapy room in the hope that victims'
psychosocial needs and their desire for justice and truth can be
counseled away. This is compounded by the fact that govern-
mental knowledge about the impact of conflict on individuals
and how to address it is generally scant, and in many countries,
the government is also responsible for some of the violence.
57. Human Rights Commission of Northern Ireland, Proposed Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland, Cl. 8(a)] (Sept. 2001).
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Trauma counseling" and community-based support work
do not in themselves deal with the past. Healing, or attempts to
assist victims of violence psychologically speaking, cannot be sep-
arated from the social and political process of dealing with the
past, which by definition includes issues such as justice. Exactly
how this process of acknowledgement could be operationalized
is still unclear, but what is clear is that a more robust debate on
truth, justice, and acknowledgement is needed, and will con-
tinue.
Victims' rights in criminal justice studies, albeit somewhat
developed, remain the poor relative to many other aspects of
criminal justice. In transitional justice studies, the concept is al-
most non-existent. This is the case not only in Northern Ireland,
but in the transitional justice field more broadly. A more rigor-
ous engagement with the issue of victims' rights still needs to be
developed and articulated. The legal underpinnings of victims'
participation in truth recovery mechanisms require regular at-
tention, as does the realization of their rights.
CONCLUSION: LEARNING LESSONS IN REVERSE
Despite the criticisms raised of the South African process in
this Essay, it is important to acknowledge that the TRC was a
bold and partially successful attempt to delve into a turbulent
past created by decades of conflict. Some of the difficulties in
the process - or so it has been argued in this Essay - con-
cerned the confusion of human and victims' rights with "com-
promise," as well as the impact of concepts such as reconciliation
on the TRC's final outcome. Oddly, however, perhaps it is these
weaknesses in the South African context that may hold some les-
sons for Northern Ireland.
The mandate of the South African TRC compelled it to in-
vestigate the "causes, nature and extent" of the South African
58. Trauma, the notion of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), itself a con-
tested term in psychological literature-critiques, and especially its role in post-conflict
societies, are beyond the present scope. See David Becker, The Deficiency of/the Concept of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder when Dealing with Victims of Human Rights Violations, in BE-
YOND TRAUMA: CULTURAL AND SOCIETAL DYNAMICS 107 (R.J. Kelber, C.R. Figley & B.P.R.
Gersons, eds., 1995); P. J. Bracken, Hidden Agendas: Deconstructing Post- Traumatic Stress
Disorder, in RFTIIINKING TIlE TRAUMA OF WAR 55 (P.J. Bracken & C. Petty eds., 1998);
ALAN YOUNG, THE HARMONY OF ILLUSIONS: INVENTINC POsT-TRAUMATIC STREss-DIsoR-
ni'is (1997).
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conflict. The TRC elucidated the broad causal and historical
picture fairly well-obviously made easier by the fact that a widely
accepted truth already existed, i.e., apartheid was a morally ab-
horrent system that brutalized many. But, on assessment, the
TRC did not simply highlight the fact that apartheid was a crime
against humanity - uncomfortable truths that challenged many
of the dominant narratives about the South African conflict
emerged in one way or another. It could be said to have
achieved a measure of success in highlighting "the causes" of the
conflict and bringing a more unified understanding of the con-
flict to bear. That said, the TRC could have certainly ventured
more boldly into the "nature and extent" of the conflict. This
Essay has highlighted some of the problems with the TRC's in-
vestigation process. In addition, the TRC could have fostered a
greater recognition of the need for multiple and ongoing mech-
anisms over time, to continue truth finding and deliver justice in
South Africa.
Contrary to this, the multitude of initiatives taking place in
Northern Ireland, largely unofficial, mean that the "nature and
extent" of the conflict is - and will certainly be - well docu-
mented over the next decade. Unlike South Africa, and simplify-
ing very complex arguments, agreeing on or at least having a
broadly accepted narrative of the "causes" of the Northern Ire-
land conflict, is one of the biggest challenges to building some
form of reconciliation into the future. The fear - not to men-
tion complexity - of exploring the "causes" in an open, honest
and inclusive way is the principal obstacle to engaging in a
macro truth finding process. Such a process, if designed cor-
rectly and impartially, would mean for all parties involved - in-
cluding the governments and public at large -potentially com-
promising on long-held beliefs about the nature of the conflict,
or at least being prepared to allow their own perspectives to be
scrutinized, and perhaps proved mistaken or misguided.
Despite the difficulties this Essay has highlighted around
too closely linking the reconciliation discourse to the amnesty
process in South Africa, perhaps the notion of reconciliation
(with all its multiple meanings) ironically holds the key for a
more consensus-driven attempt to elucidate aspects of the past
in Northern Ireland. Conceivably, a more significant official and
national attempt to deal with the past in Northern Ireland will
only take place - as optimistic or perhaps impossible as it
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sounds - once the hard-nosed desire to score political points
from the past is replaced by a more reconciliatory discourse
across the board. This would need to be built on the recogni-
tion that at some point laying the past bare will be needed, and
that this is the greatest, albeit difficult, guarantee of a stable fu-
ture in the decades to come. A delicate balance needs to be
struck. On one level, a degree of reconciliation is needed for all
to agree to any official truth recovery process. Yet, at the same
time, such reconciliation cannot compromise the truth that
should emerge. This will require political courage and, dare I
say, a level of grace and generosity seldom seen in Northern Ire-
land's conflicted history.
